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PROMOTING COMPETITION OR 
PREVENTING IT?  A COMPETITION LAW 
ANALYSIS OF UEFA’S FINANCIAL FAIR 
PLAY RULES 
CLINTON R. LONG∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rangers are one of Europe’s most storied football clubs,1 having won 
more Scottish football titles—fifty-four—than any other club.2  Based in 
Glasgow, Scotland, Rangers have long had an intense rivalry with Celtic, a 
fellow Glaswegian club, with the two sides first playing a match in 1888.3  
The Old Firm, as the rivalry is called, extends beyond the usual fanfare 
attached to a sports rivalry; there are significant religious and political 
overtones at play.4  Celtic fans are traditionally Irish and Catholic, while 
Rangers supporters are generally British, Unionist, and Protestant.5  The 
rivalry and the behavior of the clubs’ fans, which has included numerous acts 
of violence, racism, and bigotry in stadiums and on the streets, have become 
so intense that the Scottish Parliament enacted a law prohibiting sectarian 
speech related to football matches.6 
 
∗  Clinton R. Long is an International and Comparative Law LL.M. student at the George 
Washington University Law School.  Clint is a 2011 graduate of Fordham University, where he 
received his J.D. and an M.A. in International Political Economy and Development.  Clint is also a 
graduate of Brigham Young University, where he received a B.A. in History in 2008.  
1.  Because the subject matter of this paper deals with Europe, European “football” is used 
instead of the American “soccer.”  Also, “clubs” are privately owned, while teams are those that 
represent the nation in international events.  FRANKLIN FOER, HOW SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD: 
AN UNLIKELY THEORY OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (2004). 
2.  Christopher Elser, Rangers Administrators Will Consider Three Bids for Soccer Team, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/rangers-administrators-
will-consider-three-bids-for-soccer-team.html. 
3.  Brief History, CELTIC FC, httpm://www.celticfc.net/about_briefhistory (last visited Nov. 13, 
2012). 
4.  Matthew Harold, Celtic Set for Ibrox Glory as Lennon’s Men Prepare to Complete Rangers’ 
Great Collapse, GOAL.COM (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/2932/spl/2012/03/24/ 
2986439/celtic-set-for-ibrox-glory-as-lennons-men-prepare-to. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Anti-Bigot Laws Passed by the Scottish Parliament, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16138683. 
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Despite the history of the Old Firm and its place in Glaswegian and 
Scottish culture, it is possible that the rivalry could cease to exist.7  Rangers 
have entered into administration, a form of bankruptcy in the United Kingdom, 
and have among its debts approximately £49 million in unpaid taxes owed to 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.8  Serious financial irresponsibility and 
scandals have imperiled the stability of Rangers,9 and it is possible that 
Rangers could be liquidated.10  This puts the future of the Old Firm in 
jeopardy, which might not be a problem for some who think the rivalry goes 
too far,11 but it impacts the revenue—somewhere around £120 million each 
year—and thousands of jobs sustained solely by the rivalry.12 
Rangers are one of many clubs in Europe facing serious financial trouble, 
and European football’s governing body has taken actions to ensure that all 
clubs, rivalries, and leagues maintain a level of financial stability.  The Union 
of European Football Associations (UEFA) is the “parent body of European 
football” and governs the national football associations of fifty-three European 
countries and nations.13  As part of its governing responsibilities, UEFA 
recently created the controversial Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules to prevent 
clubs from getting into financial predicaments that threaten the sustainability 
of European football.  The main tenet of the FFP rules is to “live within your 
means,”14 or for a club to only spend what it earns in other words, with UEFA 
reserving the right to exclude non-compliant clubs from prestigious European 
 
7.  See Harold, supra note 4. 
8.  Id. 
9.  See Alex Guy, Scottish Premier League: Celtic-Rangers Rivalry at Stake Amidst Scandal, 
BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 19, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1071991-scottish-premier-league-
celtic-rangers-rivalry-at-stake-amidst-scandal. 
10.  Andrew Slevison, Murray Worried that Rangers Will Go into Liquidation, 
TRIBALFOOTBALL (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.tribalfootball.com/articles/murray-worried-rangers-
will-go-liquidation-3063801. 
11.  Guy, supra note 9. 
12.  Old Firm on the Ball for Economy, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/uk_news/scotland/4635535.stm. 
13.  Overview, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/history/index. 
html (last updated Jan. 28, 2012).  Some countries have multiple member associations due to 
traditional national borders.  For example, in the United Kingdom, there are four associations that are 
members of UEFA: the Welsh, Scottish, English, and Northern Irish football associations.  See UEFA 
Rankings: Country Coefficients 2012/13, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/ 
uefarankings/country/index.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2012). 
14.  Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Vice President Almunia and UEFA President 
Platini Confirm Financial Fair-Play Rules in Professional Football Are in Line with EU State Aid 
Policy (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/ 
264&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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competitions.15 
Anticipating the possibility of lawsuits over the rules and fearing the 
financial result of multiple claims for damages, UEFA President Michel 
Platini began discussions with the European Commission to declare the FFP 
rules legal under European Union (EU) law and to receive immunity from 
lawsuits under some sort of “‘judicial protection.’”16  Sometime later, the 
Commission’s Vice President, Joaquín Almunia, issued an official letter that 
applauded the FFP rules and the efforts of UEFA to protect the sport.  The 
letter stated that Almunia “fully support[s]” the rules and declared that the 
rules were consistent with state aid laws of the EU.17 
The Commission’s response to UEFA’s immunity requests is intriguing, 
as are commentators’ reactions to the Commission’s letter.  Despite the fact 
that the Commission only specifically mentioned state aid law,18 some thought 
that this declaration amounted to an exemption from Commission scrutiny 
regarding any possible violation of EU competition law.19 Others, without 
going as far as calling it an exemption, have said that for all intents and 
purposes, no challenge to the FFP rules is sustainable.  The Commission and 
UEFA “have acted to prevent any member football club mounting a challenge 
in court . . . [by saying] that the rules are fully compliant with European Union 
Law.”20  Yet, others argue that this view is mistaken, as there is no de jure or 
de facto competition law exemption, and the Commission is fully capable of 
enforcing competition law in regard to these rules.21 
With this debate come two questions regarding the FFP rules and their 
relationship to EU competition law. The answers to these questions will form 
 
15.  Leander Schaerlaeckens, Will FFP Save Football from Itself?, ESPN (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/7355528/soccer-financial-fair-play-end-football-reckless-
spending. 
16.  Platini Wants EU Cover, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.thedailystar.net/ 
newDesign/news-details.php?nid=203810 (quoting Platini). 
17.  Letter from Joaquín Almunia, Vice President, European Comm’n, to Michel Platini, 
President, UEFA (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/letter_ 
almunia_en.pdf. 
18.  State aid is “an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to 
undertakings by national public authorities,” and Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union prohibits most state aid given by Member States unless it falls under certain 
exceptions that are considered compatible with the common market.  State Aid, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/state_aids_en.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2012). 
19.  Stijn Francis, Rules of Financial Fair Play—Point of View of the European Commission, 
STIJN FRANCIS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.stijnfrancis.be/?p=372&lang=en. 
20.  UEFA and European Commission Sign Joint Agreement Endorsing Financial Fair Play 
Rules, DLA PIPER (Apr. 2012), http://info.dlapiper.com/rv/ff00049b7e8bf6c174fcdaaced4cb7098f1d 
4282/p=8. 
21.  See, e.g., Francis, supra note 19. 
LONG FORMATTED - 11-27 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2012  2:38 PM 
78 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 23:1 
the framework for this Article. 
The first question is: Has the Commission extended an exemption from 
EU competition law scrutiny to the FFP rules?  The answer to this question is 
no; the Commission told UEFA that its rules were in compliance with state aid 
law, but there is no evidence to indicate that this amounts to a de jure 
exemption from competition law scrutiny. 
The second question is: Are the FFP rules legal under Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements between undertakings?22  The answer to this 
question is unclear.  The FFP rules are problematic under Article 101 because 
competition regarding clubs, players, and sponsors is, or likely will be, 
restricted.  However, UEFA can effectively argue that the players and clubs 
have agreed to the rules, which would undermine their, but not the sponsors’, 
complaints of competition law violations.  The Commission is still 
empowered, of course, to bring its own investigation of the rules regardless of 
these parties’ acceptance of them.  While it is possible that the FFP rules could 
receive an exemption under Article 101(3), this is unlikely because there are 
less restrictive alternatives for achieving financial stability and because the 
rules eliminate competition. 
This Article will first present a brief introduction to the FFP rules and their 
implications for European clubs, which includes a short explanation of what 
UEFA is.  Next, there will be an analysis of whether the Commission’s 
response to UEFA’s request for judicial protection amounts to an EU 
competition law exemption.  Following this section is a discussion of how the 
FFP rules appear to violate Article 101 and then a section regarding the 
defenses that UEFA could raise if competition law violations exist, including 
an analysis of an Article 101(3) exemption.  Finally, a conclusion will appear 
at the end of the Article. 
II.  UEFA AND THE FFP RULES 
In order to provide a better understanding of the context of the FFP rules, 
this section will discuss UEFA and its structure and role in European football, 
 
22.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 53 [hereinafter Treaty].  Article 102 of the Treaty also deals with 
competition issues, specifically the abuse of a dominant position.  Id. art. 102.  Because of the nature 
of the FFP rules and the collaboration between UEFA and the clubs, it is more fruitful here to study 
the potential of an anticompetitive cartel than to look at UEFA as a monopoly.  Furthermore, as 
Advocate General Lenz once said regarding another football case, “the present case does not concern 
the power on the market which the clubs taken together have against competitors, customers or 
consumers,” which is what Article 102 seeks to prevent.  Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des 
Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, ¶ 286. 
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the motives that led to the creation of the FFP rules, and a description of the 
rules and their implications for European football clubs. 
A.  UEFA and the Motives for Creating the FFP Rules 
UEFA governs the national football associations of fifty-three European 
countries and nations, literally from A(thens) to Z(agreb) and everywhere in 
between.23  UEFA’s jurisdiction involves regulating international 
competitions between national teams and privately owned professional 
clubs.24  UEFA organizes two club tournaments each year: the Champions 
League, the premier event, and the Europa League, “the poor cousin.”25  The 
Champions League includes thirty-two of Europe’s best clubs that qualify 
based on a complicated system of rankings and performance in qualifying 
rounds.26  The Europa League also consists of a tournament that leads to one 
champion each season.27  As will be discussed below, a club that does not 
abide by the FFP rules could be ruled ineligible for either of these 
tournaments.28 
UEFA’s Executive Committee is the “supreme executive body” and has 
general jurisdiction over UEFA in areas not delegated to the UEFA 
Congress.29  Concerned about the financial state of many of Europe’s clubs, 
the committee used this authority to initiate the creation of the FFP rules in 
2009.30  In addition to Rangers mentioned above, some of Europe’s most 
prestigious clubs have either been spending far more than they earn, struggling 
to stay afloat financially, or both.  Spain’s Real Madrid and FC Barcelona 
have a longstanding rivalry,31 and both clubs have been spending outlandish 
 
23.  Overview, supra note 13. 
24.  Lindsey Valaine Briggs, Comment, UEFA v The European Community: Attempts of the 
Governing Body of European Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and 
Antidiscrimination Labor Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 439, 439 (2005). 
25.  Matthew Barnette, Is the UEFA Europa League the Poor Cousin of the Champions 
League?, CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TALK (Aug. 8, 2011), http://championsleaguetalk.com/2011/08/ 
08/is-the-uefa-europa-league-the-poor-cousin-of-the-champions-league/. 
26.  Competition Format, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/season= 
2012/competitionformat/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
27.  See Format, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuropaleague/season=2012/competition 
format/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
28.  Schaerlaeckens, supra note 15. 
29.  UEFA Executive Committee, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisatio 
n/executivecommittee/index.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2012). 
30.  Financial Fair Play, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthe 
game/financialfairplay/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
31.  Matthew Futterman, Real Madrid’s Bid for World Domination, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2012, 
at D12. 
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sums for some of the world’s best players.32  Real Madrid makes more than 
$500 million annually, but as of 2009, the team had a debt almost nearly as 
high.33  Its rivals in Barcelona have similar spending habits.  As of 2010, FC 
Barcelona had a debt of $578 million despite annual revenues of nearly 
$500 million and recently had to take out a loan just to make payroll.34  Both 
clubs have achieved incredible success, and their spending is directly linked to 
a desire to outdo the other and continue winning.35 
On the other side of the success spectrum are less prestigious clubs that 
have gained recent notoriety and success as a result of increased spending.  
Manchester City is a club that has never been considered among the most 
prestigious clubs in Europe, England, or even its own city.  Manchester 
United, its cross-town rival, has dominated the rivalry and is a mainstay in 
English and European football.36  Wealthy new ownership took over 
Manchester City, which led to significant upgrades in terms of player talent 
and club achievement and also enormous increases in spending.37  The club 
posted a loss of £194.9 million in a recent season, with player salaries 
consuming £174 million of payroll.38  Manchester City can handle losses for 
the time being because of the ownership’s deep pockets,39 but not all clubs 
can. 
Much of this financial behavior can be attributed to European football’s 
system of acquiring players and paying salaries.  Clubs acquire players in three 
different ways.  The first is through its own development system, which 
includes a football academy to help develop the young players’ football 
abilities.40  For the Portuguese phenom Cristiano Ronaldo, enrollment in 
Sporting Clube de Portugal’s academy came at age twelve.41  As happened 
with Ronaldo, the expectation is that the players move up through the system 
 
32.  Leander Schaerlaeckens, Rolling out of Control, ESPN (Sept. 22, 2010), http://espn.go.com 
/sports/soccer/news/_/id/5580467/european-football-eating-itself. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See Futterman, supra note 31. 
36.  See Richard Jolly, “A Win Will Change Manchester City’s History”, THE NAT’L (Apr. 30, 
2012), http://www.thenational.ae/sport/football/a-win-will-change-manchester-citys-history. 
37.  DSG, Arsene Wenger Fears Fall of Fair Play Rules, SPORT.CO.UK (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.sport.co.uk/news/Football/59637/Arsene_Wenger_fears_fall_of_fair_play_rules.aspx. 
38.  Id. 
39.  See id. 
40.  See, e.g., Blair Downey, The Bosman Ruling: European Soccer—Above the Law?, 1 ASPER 
REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 187, 189 (2001) (Can.). 
41.  Luca Caioli, “Mentally He Was Indestructible”: Why Sporting CP Paid 22,500 Euros for a 
12-Year-Old Cristiano Ronaldo, GOAL.COM (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/1956/ 
europe/2012/04/06/3017515/mentally-he-was-indestructible-why-sporting-cp-paid-22500. 
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and its various levels of teams to eventually play for the highest club in the 
organization.42 
The second way of acquiring players is by purchasing them with one club 
paying the other a transfer fee in exchange for the player.43  In Ronaldo’s case, 
when his current club Real Madrid purchased him from Manchester United, 
the transfer fee was approximately £80 million, which did not include his 
yearly salary of about £11 million.44  His contract also includes a clause 
requiring a payment of €1 billion from anyone seeking to buy him from Real 
Madrid.45 
The third manner of acquiring new players is to sign them to a contract 
after their contracts with their previous teams have expired.  Before a 
landmark decision in the Bosman case by the European Court of Justice in 
1995 and per UEFA rules in existence at the time, signing a player whose 
contract had expired required the payment of a transfer fee between the two 
clubs.46  Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian football player, wanted to change 
clubs47 and succeeded in convincing the Court of Justice that this transfer fee 
requirement violated the Treaty’s guarantee of the free movement of 
workers.48  After this decision, EU nationals whose contracts expire are free 
agents and can pursue agreements with other clubs without having to depend 
on the acceptance of compensation by their old clubs.49  With the free agency 
system and the enormous transfer fees and salaries, it is not hard to see how 
many clubs are struggling financially. 
 
42.  See, e.g., Downey, supra note 40, at 189. 
43.  Rick J. Lopez, Comment, Signing Bonus Skimming and a Premature Call for a Global 
Draft in Major League Baseball, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 374 (2009). 
44.  Ronaldo Completes £80m Real Move, BBC SPORT  (July 1, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/8121951.stm. 
45.  Real Madrid Shield Cristiano Ronaldo with €1bn Buy-Out Clause, INSIDE WORLD SOCCER 
(June 23, 2009), http://www.insideworldsoccer.com/2009/06/cristiano-ronaldo-real-madrid-
contract.html. 
46.  Downey, supra note 40, at 189. 
47.  Bosman’s contract worth 120,000 Belgian francs (BFR) per month with RC Liège was 
expiring, and RC Liège offered him a new one-year deal for 30,000 BFR per month. Case C-415/93, 
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, ¶¶ 42–43.  
Bosman found a French club—US Dunkerque—that wanted to sign him, and the two clubs agreed on 
a transfer that required the filing of the transfer certificate from the Belgian national football 
association (URBSFA) to its French counterpart (FFF) by a certain day.  Id. ¶ 44.  Because RC Liège 
did not believe that US Dunkerque could afford the transfer fee, it did not request that URBSFA 
complete the filing requirement to FFF by the due date, the deal did not go through, and the club 
suspended Bosman for the season.  Id. 
48.  Id. ¶¶ 248–49. 
49.  See Downey, supra note 40, at 190. 
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B.  FFP Rules 
To fight financial instability, UEFA has approved the FFP rules, which 
require all clubs that participate in UEFA competitions to break even each 
season or be relatively close to breaking even.50  The rules apply to all clubs 
that compete in UEFA competitions.51  There are three monitoring periods for 
all clubs: the first period is the calendar year that ends during the current or 
most recent season, and the second and third periods are the two years prior to 
that calendar year.52  What is measured is the difference between “relevant 
income” and “relevant expenses.”53 “Relevant income” includes ticket sales, 
broadcasting revenue, and other similar sources of income,54 and “relevant 
expenses” includes salaries among other costs.55 
The “break-even requirement” at the heart of the FFP rules is that relevant 
expenses cannot exceed relevant income, with some exceptions.56  There is a 
permissible deviation of €5 million for one period.57  However, if the disparity 
is “entirely covered by contributions from equity participants and/or related 
parties,” the amount of permissible deviation is €45 million for the 2013–2014 
and 2014–2015 measuring periods and €30 million for the 2015–2016, 2016–
2017, and 2018–2019 periods.58  This requirement will be applicable to all 
clubs beginning with the 2013–2014 season, which means that 2012 will be 
the first reporting period, and penalties for not breaking even during certain 
periods can be imposed beginning with the 2014–2015 season.59 
The “ultimate penalty” that can be imposed is “exclusion from 
competitions.”60  The enforcement mechanism of these rules includes the Club 
Financial Control Panel, which has the jurisdiction to conduct audits, evaluate 
the information submitted by the clubs, and generally assess whether the FFP 
rules and the break-even requirement are being followed.61  The bottom line of 
 
50.  See generally UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS arts. 57–
63 (2010) [hereinafter FFP RULES]. 
51.  Id. art. 57. 
52.  Id. art. 59(1). 
53.  Id. art. 60(1). 
54.  Id. art. 58(1). 
55.  Id. art. 58(2). 
56.  Id. art. 63. 
57.  Id. art. 61(2). 
58.  Id.  
59.  Securing a Long-Term Balance, 105 UEFA DIRECT, 2011, at 12, 12, available at 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/EuroExperience/uefaorg/Publications/01/59/87/45/
1598745_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Club Financial Control Panel, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Down 
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the rules is that clubs must be able to pay their employees, including the 
players, and other clubs in transfer fee arrangements, or they cannot participate 
in UEFA competitions.62 
III.  THE COMMISSION’S APPROVAL OF THE FFP RULES 
A.  UEFA and the Commission 
The FFP rules have been met with skepticism. The manager of Arsenal, a 
well-known English football club, Arsène Wenger, doubts not only that UEFA 
will have the ability to enforce the rules but also that clubs like Manchester 
City and its enormous debt can meet the break-even requirement so quickly.63  
Newcastle United manager Alan Pardew expressed pessimism that the rich 
clubs will be bound by the rules, saying that they will likely be able to find 
their way around the rules with other sources of income.64  A frequently 
mentioned potential loophole is for owners to find ways of padding their 
relevant income—and thus, the amount they can spend—by, for example, 
having another company they own sponsor their club.65 
In the face of skepticism and criticism, UEFA has sought protection 
against legal action by upset clubs.  Some clubs care more about staying 
financially afloat than others,66 but any club would be upset by exclusion from 
competition, also known as the “atomic bomb.”67  UEFA says that it is 
confident that its rules are in compliance with EU law and that it would prevail 
in court,68 but UEFA President Michel Platini stated “I know the clubs will 
take us to court.  It’s the first thing they will do [if they are excluded from 
UEFA competitions].”69  Platini went to the president of the European 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in order to get the Commission to give the 
 
load/uefaorg/Clublicensing/01/64/89/99/1648999_DOWNLOAD.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
62.  See Securing a Long-Term Balance, supra note 59, at 12. 
63.  DSG, supra note 37. 
64.  Mark Douglas, Don’t Let Rich Clubs Out of New Rules, Pleads Alan Pardew, SUNDAY SUN 
(U.K.), Apr. 1, 2012, at 68. 
65.  Manchester City’s Deal with Etihad an ‘Improper Transaction’ as Uefa Urged to Outlaw 
‘Close’ Contracts, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/ 
manchester-city/9128914/Manchester-Citys-deal-with-Etihad-an-improper-transaction-as-Uefa-urged 
-to-outlaw-close-contracts.html [hereinafter Manchester City].  
66.  See Futterman, supra note 31. 
67.  Matt Slater, Uefa’s Plan for Balanced Budgets & Level Playing Fields, BBC SPORT (Aug. 
16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/14482429. 
68.  David Conn, Uefa Intends to Sanction Clubs Who Continue to Report Huge Losses, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 25, 2012, at 46. 
69.  Platini Wants EU Cover, supra note 16. 
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FFP rules “‘judicial protection.’”70  Otherwise, Platini argued, multiple large 
claims by clubs could threaten the existence of UEFA.71  Barroso said he 
would “‘deal with it.’”72  The breadth of the desired protection and what 
Barroso meant in response are unclear. 
Similarly ambiguous is the Commission’s response.  In March 2012, 
Joaquín Almunia (who currently holds a dual role as Vice President of the 
Commission and Competition Commissioner)73 and President Platini 
published a joint statement regarding the Commission’s opinion of the FFP 
rules.74  The statement applauded the FFP rules and said that the rules were 
consistent with state aid law.75  Vice President Almunia also sent a letter to 
President Platini to pledge support to the FFP rules and to tout the policy 
reasons behind the rules.76 
B.  Does This Amount to a Competition Law Exemption? 
A number of commentators interpreted the Commission’s response to 
mean that UEFA and the Commission were both saying that the FFP rules are 
“fully compliant with European law,”77 which would include an exemption 
from competition law scrutiny.78  According to some commentators, there is 
now “little sense in clubs challenging the ruling.”79  UEFA Secretary General 
Gianni Infantino agreed, saying, “[I]t reaffirms what we have always said that 
the FFP rules are legal and in accordance with European legislation.”80 
Unless these commentators are privy to information not available to the 
general public, it does not appear that the Commission has decided anything 
about competition law’s relationship to the rules.  Perhaps the commentators 
 
70.  Id. (quoting Platini). 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. (quoting Platini). 
73.  Joaquín Almunia, Mandate, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/almunia/about/mandate/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
74.  See generally Joint Statement by Joaquín Almunia, Vice President, European Comm’n, and 
Michael Platini, President, UEFA (Mar. 21, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/joint_statement_en.pdf. 
75.  Id.  For a brief definition of state aid law, see State Aid, supra note 18.  
76.  See generally Letter from Joaquín Almunia to Michel Platini, supra note 17. 
77.  Financial Fair Play Loophole Closed as EC Agree Rules Fit with European Law, MAIL 
ONLINE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2118248/UEFA-Financial-
Fair-Play-loophole-closed.html [hereinafter Financial Fair Play Loophole]. 
78.  Francis, supra note 19. 
79.  Financial Fair Play Loophole, supra note 77. 
80.  Mike Collett, Platini Wins EC Backing for Financial Fair Play Regulations, INDEPENDENT 
(U.K.), Mar. 22, 2012, at 76. 
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have exaggerated the Commission’s announcement or been confused by the 
fact that it came from the Competition Commissioner.81  Also, some might 
think that because Vice President Almunia, also the Competition 
Commissioner, did not say anything about any competition problems with the 
FFP rules, he would not support investigating any competition complaints 
about the FFP rules.  This collection of assumptions could make one think that 
there is some de facto exemption because, if Vice President Almunia does not 
want any investigations brought, then the Commission will not bring them.  
However, if he had wanted to discourage clubs from bringing their 
competition claims to the Commission, his letter to President Platini and the 
joint statement did not say so.  Furthermore, it is clear from the Commission 
White Paper on Sport that there is no general exemption for sports under EU 
law.82 
While the relationship between Vice President Almunia and President 
Platini seems to be cordial83 and the joint statement makes it seem that the 
Commission and UEFA agree on some aspects of the FFP rules, this is no 
guarantee that the Commission will refrain from enforcing any competition 
law violations.  The two bodies have clashed in the past over competition 
issues. After the Court of Justice decided Bosman, UEFA said it would not 
abide by the decision.84  Even though the Court of Justice did not rule on the 
competition issues at issue in Bosman, then-Competition Commissioner Karl 
Van Miert threatened UEFA with heavy fines if it did not implement the 
court’s rulings.85  UEFA begrudgingly agreed to follow the decision while 
continuing to complain about what would happen to football as a result.86  
Although the relationship between Vice President Almunia and President 
Platini appears warmer than this, it is clear that the Commission has the 
authority to enforce competition law87 and that “[b]y not ruling on the 
competition issue [in Bosman], the court placed the burden of interpreting the 
 
81.  State aid law, which is what Vice President Almunia said the FFP rules complied with, falls 
within the Directorate General for Competition’s jurisdiction. Directorate General for Competition, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
82.  Commission White Paper on Sport, at 13, COM (2007) 391 final (July 11, 2007) (“Sport 
activity is subject to the application of EU law.”). 
83.  For example, in his letter announcing his support of the FFP rules, Vice President Almunia 
wrote “Cher Michel” (“Dear Michel”) next to the more formal “Mr. le Président” introduction that 
had been typed onto the page.  Letter from Joaquín Almunia to Michel Platini, supra note 17. 
84.  Patrick Closson, Note, Penalty Shot: The European Union’s Application of Competition 
Law to the Bosman Ruling, 21 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 167, 175–76 (1998). 
85.  Id. at 168. 
86.  Id. at 177. 
87.  Directorate General for Competition, supra note 81. 
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competition law in the hands of the Commission.”88  Vice President Almunia 
and his successors are not prevented from enforcing EU competition law just 
because UEFA and the Commission signed a joint letter regarding state aid 
law. 
Additionally, parties in the EU can seek guidance from the Commission 
on potential competition law violations.  The Commission can issue an 
“informal guidance letter” if a party is unclear about a potential competition 
law violation, and the Commission can also state in some cases whether a set 
of facts meet the requirements of Article 101(1) or Article 101(3).89  The joint 
statement, related press releases, and letters did not mention any specific 
requests by UEFA for such statements or decisions.  Because there has been 
no official Commission statement giving the FFP rules an exemption under 
EU competition law, the FFP rules are subject to the competition laws of 
the EU. 
IV.  COMPETITION LAW AND THE FFP RULES 
In order to navigate through the world of EU competition law and how it 
applies to the FFP rules, this Section will proceed as follows.  First, in order to 
understand whether competition law has been violated, it is essential to define 
the relevant markets.  Second, because competition law only applies to a sport 
“in so far as it constitutes an economic activity,”90 it must be determined 
whether the FFP rules involve an economic activity.  In the next subsection, 
Article 101 will be summarized and an assessment will be made as to whether 
the FFP rules violate Article 101.  The last portion examines potential defenses 
that UEFA would have against such claims, including the possibility of 
receiving an exception provided by Article 101(3). 
A.  Relevant Markets 
There are three main parties that could potentially complain to the 
Commission about a competition law violation by the FFP rules: clubs, 
players, and sponsors.  In order to determine the relevant market, it is 
important to do so for all three groups.  Guidance from the Commission shows 
how this is to be done. 
When defining the relevant market, the Commission measures the relevant 
 
88.  Closson, supra note 84, at 181. 
89.  See LENNART RITTER & W. DAVID BRAUN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 98 (3d ed. 2004). 
90.  Commission White Paper on Sport, supra note 82, at 13. 
LONG FORMATTED - 11-27 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2012  2:38 PM 
2012] UEFA’S FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES  87 
geographic market and product market.91  The geographic market “comprises 
the area in which the firms concerned are involved in the supply of products or 
services and in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous.”92  It is important to point out that the FFP rules do not deal 
directly with competition on the field; they govern financial competition and, 
in essence, what clubs can spend on their players.  Because all UEFA member 
leagues must abide by the same rules regarding finances, player transfers and 
signings, and so forth, the conditions for competing for players are 
homogenous across UEFA even if the level of play on the field and the quality 
of competition in each league are not.  It is therefore logical to define the 
geographical market in this situation as the countries whose national football 
associations make up UEFA. 
The product market “comprises all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of 
the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”93  This can 
be difficult to define because of different levels of quality among the clubs, 
leagues, and players, but it is important to remember that the FFP rules deal 
with financial transactions.  These definitions, however, are for general 
purposes in completing this competition law analysis. 
The products that clubs seek in terms of the FFP rules are professional 
football players.  If a club cannot acquire one professional player that it wants 
at the price it is willing to pay, it seeks another who meets its requirements.  It 
is impossible to define the substitutability on specific terms because, unlike 
identical widgets that come from multiple factories, each player is unique.  But 
generally speaking, professional football players playing in UEFA member 
leagues are interchangeable depending on their skills, position, price tag, and 
so forth.  The product market for clubs should be defined as professional 
football players. 
For players, the product market must be defined in terms of the services 
they provide for pay.  Just as players can be interchangeable for a club, a club 
and the salary it pays can be substitutable for a player.  Depending on the 
price, location, management, and other issues, if a player finds that a club 
cannot meet his needs, he can find another club that does.  Player salaries and 
the mobility of players at the right price are what will be impacted by the FFP 
rules.  The products, therefore, for players are UEFA’s clubs who pay for the 
players’ services. 
 
91.  Definition of Relevant Market, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competit 
ion/firms/l26073_en.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2011). 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
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For sponsors, the product market relates to what they are paying for: 
publicity and visibility.  While the more prestigious clubs will provide more 
publicity for a sponsor’s name on a jersey or stadium, clubs can be 
interchangeable for these sponsors based on the price and branding 
opportunities that exist.  Sponsoring Manchester United will bring more 
visibility and cost more to a sponsor than sponsoring a small club from Malta, 
but in general terms, the product market for sponsors is exactly what the FFP 
rules could affect: UEFA’s clubs who take sponsors’ money in exchange for 
naming rights to stadiums, jerseys, and so forth. 
B.  Economic Activity 
The Commission has stated that “[c]ompetition law and Internal Market 
provisions apply to sport in so far as it constitutes an economic activity.”94  
The Court of Justice has said that “any activity consisting in offering goods or 
services on a given market is an economic activity.”95 UEFA is clearly 
engaged in economic activities in its implementation of financial controls over 
its clubs.  UEFA also performs economic activities in governing two European 
club tournaments, which consists of offering goods (merchandise) and services 
(football matches), and determining who plays in them based on the FFP rules.  
The Commission has also stated explicitly that UEFA “engages directly in 
economic activities.”96  Because the FFP rules directly relate to who can 
participate in these tournaments and how each club can spend its money—or 
money it does not have—the FFP rules should be considered to relate to an 
economic activity. 
C.  Article 101 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market . . . .”97  In order to 
determine if the FFP rules violate Article 101(1), it is necessary to analyze the 
article’s requirements separately.  The FFP rules do present some problems 
under Article 101(1) because they are anticompetitive in many ways. 
 
94.  Commission White Paper on Sport, supra note 82, at 13. 
95.  Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID v. Dimosio, 2008 E.C.R. I-
4863, ¶ 22. 
96.  Commission Decision (EC) 2003/778, 2003 O.J. (L 291) 25, 42. 
97.  Treaty art. 101(1). 
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1.  Agreements Between Undertakings 
Article 101(1) prohibits “agreements between undertakings” that have the 
requisite anticompetitive object or effect.98  The Court of Justice defines an 
undertaking as “any entity engaged in an economic activity.”99  As seen 
above, UEFA is engaged in economic activity by regulating the finances of its 
clubs and hosting tournaments that include clubs that comply with the FFP 
rules.100  The Commission has also stated that each football club and national 
association is an undertaking.101  Also, because national associations are 
considered both undertakings and associations of undertakings, UEFA is, 
therefore, an undertaking, an association of undertakings, and an association of 
associations of undertakings.102 
For an agreement to exist under Article 101, “it is sufficient that the 
undertakings in question should have expressed their joint intention to conduct 
themselves on the market in a specific way.”103  With UEFA sponsoring the 
rules, the European Club Association (representing the clubs), the European 
Professional Football Leagues (representing the national associations), and 
FIFPro Europe (representing the players) unanimously agreed to the rules 
which would govern clubs’ financial behavior.104  It is clear that these 
undertakings “have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on 
the [European football] market in a specific way.”105 
2.  Affect Trade Between the Member States 
Any agreement between undertakings must also “affect trade between the 
Member States” in order to fall under Article 101(1).106  Advocate General 
Lenz has said that agreements meet this requirement “only if they are ‘capable 
of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a 
manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market 
between the Member States.’  The adverse effect must also be appreciable.”107 
 
98.  Id. 
99.  Dimosio, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 21 (citations omitted). 
100.  See supra Part IV.B. 
101.  EC 2003/778, 2003 O.J. (L 291) at 42. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Case T-7/89, SA Hercules Chem. NV v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-1711, ¶ 256. 
104.  Green Light for Financial Fair Play, UEFA.COM (Sept. 5, 2009), http://www.uefa.com/ 
uefa/stakeholders/professionalfootballstrategycouncil/news/newsid=879610.html. 
105.  SA Hercules Chem. NV, 1991 E.C.R. ¶ 256. 
106.  Treaty art. 101(1). 
107.  Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 
1995 E.C.R. I-4921, ¶ 260 (quoting Case C-22/78 Hugin v. Comm’n 1979 E.C.R. 1869, ¶ 17). 
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There is significant evidence in favor of the argument that the FFP rules are 
capable of threatening trade in each of the three relevant markets and that the 
effect is appreciable. 
Regarding the product markets for players and clubs, the FFP rules clearly 
have an appreciable impact on the trade of services between the two groups.  
A number of player transfers occur between clubs from different EU member 
states, as four of the five most expensive transfers ever fall into this 
category.108  In terms of appreciable effect, in 2012, English Premier League 
clubs spent seventy percent (£60 million) less on player transfers than they did 
in the 2011 transfer window due in large part to the new FFP rules.109  The 
FFP rules clearly have reduced spending, and this inevitably has an impact on 
the internal market in terms of football players and clubs. 
A seventy percent reduction in spending must be considered appreciable, 
and clubs are limited in what they can do with their money even if rich enough 
to compensate for budget deficits.  As one commentator said, “What [the FFP 
rules] means is that in the future it will become much harder for billionaires to 
buy middling mid-table clubs—think Malaga, Paris Saint-Germain, 
Manchester City—and turn them into giants and start beating up on everybody 
else.”110  Furthermore, if UEFA ever decides to impose a transfer ban as a 
penalty for falling short of the break-even requirement, as UEFA has 
considered,111 non-compliant clubs would not be able to purchase players.  
Players would be limited in their options of choosing a club and that would 
impact the markets for players and clubs between member states even more. 
Sponsorship deals have already been a point of debate in regard to their 
role in the FFP rules.112  Some fear that sponsorship deals will be “inflated” to 
provide a club with additional income to spend in order to get around the FFP 
rules.113  The clubs that receive large sponsorship deals like Manchester City’s 
£350 million deal with Etihad Airways for ten years of jersey, stadium, and 
 
108.  See Keesh Sundaresan, 10 Most Expensive Transfer Deals in the History of Football, LIVE 
SOCCER TV (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.livesoccertv.com/news/2657/10-most-expensive-transfer-
deals-in-the-history-of-football/. 
109.  Football Transfer Dealings Plummet in January Window, CNN U.S. (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-01/football/sport_football_football-transfer-window-dealings_1_clu 
bs-thiago-motta-spending?_s=PM:FOOTBALL. 
110.  Schaerlaeckens, supra note 15. 
111.  Paul Kelso, Uefa Shelves Proposals to Impose a Transfer Ban on Clubs that Breach Its 
Financial Fair-Play Rules, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 23, 2011, at 9. 
112.  Andrew Nixon, Sponsorship: FFP and Competition Rules, SPORT LAW. (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/142396/Antitrust+Competition/The+Sport+Lawyer+Sponsorship+FFP+an
d+Competition+Rules. 
113.  Id. 
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practice facility naming rights114 argue that “market forces dictate what they 
can and cannot command for the naming rights to their stadium . . . .”115  
While some argue that UEFA should be skeptical of large sponsorship deals 
like Manchester City’s,116 the FFP rules could influence sponsorship deals that 
occur across member states.117  Any restriction of these sponsorship deals 
could have an appreciable effect considering the prices sponsors like Etihad 
Airways pay for naming and other rights. 
The agreement between undertakings regarding the FFP rules will affect 
the markets for players, clubs, and sponsorships.  Because of the nature of 
today’s football markets throughout Europe, the rules are clearly “‘capable of 
constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner 
which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between 
the Member States’” with “appreciable” impact.118 
3. Object or Effect Is the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition 
Determining whether the object of an agreement is to distort competition 
requires an analysis of “the nature of the measure and the aims which it 
pursues, in the light of the economic context in which it was to be applied.”119  
The economic context that UEFA’s FFP rules have been born into is one of 
instability.  It is understandable that UEFA would want to implement rules to 
prevent clubs and leagues from going bankrupt. 
In performing this analysis, it also is necessary “to consider the precise 
purpose of the agreement” in order to determine if its object is to harm 
competition.120  The objectives that UEFA has stated for its FFP rules can 
serve as a source for the precise purposes, the first two of which are “to 
introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances [and] to 
 
114.  Ian Ladyman, Manchester City Defend £350m Etihad Stadium Deal as UEFA Plot 
Investigation, MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-
2026782/Manchester-City-defend-Etihad-Stadium-deal.html. 
115.  Nixon, supra note 112. 
116.  See id.  The man in charge of enforcing the FFP rules is already skeptical of the 
Manchester City deal.  Slater, supra note 67. 
117.  For example, Real Madrid in Spain has as its current jersey sponsor an Austrian gambling 
company (bwin), and the previous sponsor was BenQ, a German company.  Matt Cutler, Real Madrid 
Extends bwin Shirt Sponsorship, SPORT BUS. (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/ 
170577/real-madrid-extends-bwin-shirt-sponsorship. 
118.  Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 
1995 E.C.R. I-4921, ¶ 260 (quoting Case C-22/78 Hugin v. Comm’n 1979 E.C.R. 1869, ¶ 17). 
119.  Case T-368/00, Gen. Motors Nederland BV v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4491, ¶ 102. 
120.  Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-9291, 
¶ 55. 
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decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary effect.”121 
The Commission has also said that the object of an agreement violates 
101(1) if “by their very nature [the rules] have the potential of restricting 
competition.”122  These stated objectives appear problematic under this 
definition.  Some of UEFA’s intentions in bringing about the FFP rules were 
to stop salaries from increasing and to, in essence, decrease spending by 
football clubs.  This appears to restrict competition because clubs are 
prevented from spending what they want, and they cannot keep up with clubs 
that have more revenue.123  The players are also prevented from getting the 
salaries that they could on a free market because of the FFP rules.124 
Additional guidance from the Commission similarly points to the 
possibility that the object of the FFP rules is anticompetitive: “Does the 
agreement restrict actual or potential competition that would have existed in 
the absence of the contractual restraint(s)?  If so, the agreement may be caught 
by [Article 101(1)].”125  If there were no FFP rules, clubs would not be bound 
by regulations on what they can spend, sponsors would not have to worry 
about seeing their deals struck down, and players could get the salaries that the 
clubs deem them to deserve in the open market.  While UEFA’s overall 
intentions in restricting these actions by clubs are meant to help football,126 
some objects of the rules are to restrict competition. 
If the object of the FFP rules was to prevent, restrict, or distort 
competition, or if UEFA’s anticompetitive objects outweigh the 
procompetitive justifications for the restrictions, then the agreement would 
violate Article 101(1) even if there were no anticompetitive effects.127  
However, because it is unclear if the Commission or the Court of Justice 
would find the object of the FFP rules to be restrictive, and for the sake of 
completeness, it is important to look at the effects analysis under Article 
101(1). 
 
121.  Financial Fair Play, supra note 30. 
122.  Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 
O.J. (C 101) 97, 100 [hereinafter Article 101(3) Guidelines]. 
123.  Daniel Geey, UEFA Financial Fair Play: Are the Rules Anti-Competitive?, BEYOND THE 
PITCH (July 14, 2011), http://www.beyondthepitch.net/articles/post/index.cfm/2011/07/14/uefa-
financial-fair-play-are-the-rules-anti-competitive/. 
124.  Stefan Szymanski, Professor, U. Mich., Presentation at Cass Business School: An 
Assessment of UEFA's Financial Fairplay Rules, available at 
http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/image/knowledgebank/Challengesforfootball_pdf/Stefan_Szy
manski.pdf. 
125.  Article 101(3) Guidelines, supra note 122, at 99. 
126.  Financial Fair Play, supra note 30. 
127.  Article 101(3) Guidelines, supra note 122, at 98. 
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In order for there to be an effect that meets the Article 101(1) requirement, 
“it is necessary to find that those factors are present which show that 
competition has in fact been prevented, restricted or distorted to an appreciable 
extent.”128  Furthermore, the agreement can still be found in violation of 
competition law if there are prospective negative effects, which the 
Commission refers to as “likely anti-competitive effects.”129  Despite their 
short existence, there is already some evidence that the rules have had an 
impact on competition in the market for players between clubs.  Clubs in the 
English Premier League and other major leagues are spending less on player 
transfers in large part because of the FFP rules.130  The clubs spent an 
estimated £60 million less on player salaries in 2012 than in 2011, a seventy 
percent decrease.131  This is not due to a lack of marquee players; rather, this 
season is the first reporting period for the FFP rules, and clubs are trying to 
abide by the rules.132  This clearly restricts and prevents the ability of club 
owners to spend what they want on their clubs and to compete with other clubs 
for players.133 
The effect of these rules is that competition is also being distorted.  The 
most detrimental effect of the FFP rules is that they appear to lock the football 
class structure firmly into place: the clubs with more income can spend more 
on players, while the poorer clubs cannot spend as much based solely on their 
lower income.134  It follows, therefore, that the rich clubs will acquire the 
best—and most expensive—players and continue to make money.  The poorer 
clubs are forced to live with low income because nothing but increased 
revenue will permit them to spend more money to acquire better players, and 
owners cannot offer their own funds to help the team get out of this hole.  The 
better a team is, the better its chances are of success in UEFA’s tournaments, 
which provides considerable perks and makes the rich clubs even richer and 
the poor clubs worse off in comparison.135 
The market for players in determining which clubs to play for also appears 
 
128.  Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-9291, 
¶ 55. 
129.  Article 101(3) Guidelines, supra note 122, at 100. 
130.  Football Transfer Dealings Plummet in January Window, supra note 109. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Geey, supra note 123. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Manchester United received €53.197 million in television revenue and award money for 
finishing in second place in the Champions League in 2011.  Gavin Hamilton, UEFA’s Financial 
Fairplay Regulations Miss the Target, WORLD SOCCER, http://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/ 
uefas-financial-fairplay-regulations-miss-the-target (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
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to be restricted.  Clubs have already decreased their spending more than in the 
past and more than they presumably would if there were no regulations 
governing their finances.136  If clubs are spending less, it appears that players’ 
options and mobility will be more limited in terms of the quantity of clubs 
seeking their services or in terms of lower salaries.  This result would not 
occur if not for the rules,137 and the rules prevent players from competing with 
others on the open market and getting the salary market forces would 
provide.138 
The rules have only been in place for a short time and the future will tell 
whether the effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort competition.  There are 
some foreseeable scenarios that could create other problematic effects, and the 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects is enough to trigger an Article 101(1) 
violation.139  The most obvious is a situation in which a club is excluded from 
a tournament for failing to meet the break-even requirement.  This would 
literally restrict a club from competing on the field and financially as a result 
of lost revenue, fan base, and relevance, and this is an anticompetitive effect of 
the FFP rules. 
Sponsors might also have reason to complain about the FFP rules 
depending on how they are administered.  As mentioned above, sponsorship 
deals are now under greater scrutiny and skepticism because some believe 
clubs will use them to get around the FFP rules.140  While there is no evidence 
that UEFA has the authority to annul a sponsorship deal that has this intent, 
some believe that it should have that power.141  Even if UEFA does not have 
that power but decides to somehow modify the numbers of the club’s break-
even analysis, the effect of the rules in that situation would be to prevent and 
restrict sponsors and clubs from entering into sponsorship agreements for 
football jerseys and stadiums.  This is a restriction on competition and would 
be problematic under Article 101(1). 
It is possible that other problems with Article 101(1) will arise once the 
FFP rules have had more of an impact on football competition both on and off 
the field.  For now, it is clear that there are competition law problems for 
UEFA and its rules. 
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D.  UEFA’s Defenses to Potential Article 101(1) Claims 
Despite the potential competition problems its FFP rules face, UEFA does 
have two main defenses to potential Article 101(1) violations. 
1.  The Clubs and Players Agreed to the FFP Rules 
The best defense UEFA would have in the face of an Article 101(1) 
complaint is that the clubs agreed to the FFP rules.142  UEFA and the 
European Club Association (ECA), which represents European clubs, worked 
together to formulate the FFP rules, and both sides made concessions over 
what the FFP rules would cover and entail.143  The clubs and other parties 
involved in the negotiations over the FFP rules unanimously agreed to 
them.144  It would be difficult for a club to claim a violation under these FFP 
rules when it agreed to them.145  Furthermore, the European Commission 
considers clubs as undertakings,146 and UEFA can be considered an 
association of associations (national leagues) of undertakings (clubs) under 
Article 101(1).147  If the FFP rules are anticompetitive, then it seems 
counterintuitive that the clubs can complain about anticompetitive rules when 
they are the undertakings that make up UEFA and its member leagues 
regarding the FFP Rules. 
UEFA could also defend against an Article 101(1) claim brought by a 
player by arguing that the players agreed to the FFP rules through their 
players’ association, FIFPro, which was active in the agreement on the 
rules.148  The players are not undertakings under Article 101(1) and, therefore, 
would not find themselves in the same awkward position of the clubs.  In any 
case, it would be interesting to see how the Court of Justice would rule on a 
situation in which the player bringing the case technically agreed to the rules 
through FIFPro. 
The acceptance of the players and clubs is a defense that UEFA can surely 
use to undermine a complaint by either group.  It is unclear how influential 
this defense would be at the Commission or the Court of Justice.  However, 
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regardless of these parties’ acceptance of the FFP rules, the Commission has 
the authority to enforce competition law and would not be prevented from 
investigating the FFP rules if it estimated that there might be violations.149  In 
any case, it is a useful defense for UEFA.  Also, sponsors have not agreed to 
these FFP rules, and their complaints about violations of Article 101(1) could 
not be met with the same defense. 
2.  Article 101(3) 
UEFA can also seek protection under Article 101(3), which provides an 
exception to a violation of Article 101(1).  Article 101(3), in its relevant parts, 
says that 101(1) is “inapplicable” when the anticompetitive agreement or 
behavior at issue “contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit . . . .”150  Furthermore, the 
behavior must not “impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives” or “afford such 
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.”151  If an agreement that violates 
Article 101(1) meets these requirements, then it “shall not be prohibited, no 
prior decision to that effect being required.”152  These “agreements are valid 
and enforceable from the moment that the conditions of [Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty] are satisfied and for as long as that remains the case.”153 
According to the European Commission, these Article 101(3) 
requirements amount to a balancing of procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects, and only the four requirements imposed by the article 
are analyzed.154  Each requirement will be analyzed separately here to 
determine whether UEFA’s FFP rules would qualify for this protection. 
a.  Efficiency Gains 
In order to qualify as an efficiency gain, the “restrictive agreement must 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress.  The provision refers expressly 
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only to goods, but applies by analogy to services.”155  Furthermore, each 
efficiency claim must have the following: 
(a)  The nature of the claimed efficiencies; 
(b)  The link between the agreement and the efficiencies; 
(c)  The likelihood and magnitude of each claimed efficiency; 
and 
(d)  How and when each claimed efficiency would be 
achieved.156 
UEFA would argue that the nature of the efficiency gained in this situation 
is the financial viability of football in Europe, which is an objective benefit as 
required under this analysis.157  The rules specifically state what clubs can and 
cannot do financially, and they give clubs incentives to invest in development 
of younger players and similar long-term investments that can help a team 
maintain economic strength for longer periods of time.158  This stability is 
certainly an efficiency that can help the economic progress of football, at least 
on paper. 
The link between this efficiency and the FFP rules is clear and direct: the 
rules have been created with the direct purpose of making sure that clubs 
survive financially.159  The likelihood of the efficiency is relatively high; the 
rules have already stopped many clubs from spending as much as usual,160 and 
clubs have a strong incentive to obey so that they can participate in UEFA’s 
tournaments.  The magnitude is also likely to be far-reaching because the rules 
apply to all clubs who form the national associations of UEFA.161  The 
timeframe for achieving the efficiency is clearly set out in measuring periods 
in the FFP rules, and the intention is to bring clubs to financial stability within 
a certain amount of years or to impose sanctions.162  It is hoped that, although 
some financial restraints are placed on the clubs, the FFP rules will lead to 
stable economic progress in the sense that all clubs will be more financially 
responsible and that the sport will prosper.163  Time will tell if this will 
happen, but for now, it appears that the FFP rules constitute an efficiency 
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because they create benefits for the football economy.164 
b.  Fair Share to Consumers 
The FFP rules must also benefit the consumers.165  The consumers are “all 
direct or indirect users of the products covered by the agreement . . . .”166  If 
the FFP rules leave these consumers in a worse position than they would be 
without the rules, then this condition is not met.167  This is analyzed based on 
the “overall impact on consumers of the products within the relevant market 
and not the impact on individual members of this group of consumers.”168 
The products in this case can be many: football for the fans, players for the 
clubs, clubs for the players, and sponsorship deals for the sponsors.  UEFA 
would argue that all parties will be better off because football will be more 
stable.  However, the rules restrict many clubs’ abilities to compete with 
powerhouses by spending more than they earn to acquire better players.  This, 
it can be argued, hurts consumers because their club could be better without 
the FFP rules.  The FFP rules also appear to harm players, clubs, and sponsors 
by placing restrictions on the amount of money they can spend and receive.  
The FFP rules are not old enough to know for sure what the benefits are, and 
time will tell if these parties benefit from the stability or are harmed by the 
restrictions.169 
c.  Indispensable Restrictions 
Determining if the restrictions are indispensable involves a two-part test: 
“First, the restrictive agreement as such must be reasonably necessary in order 
to achieve the efficiencies.  Secondly, the individual restrictions of 
competition that flow from the agreement must also be reasonably necessary 
for the attainment of the efficiencies.”170  Some commentators argue that the 
FFP rules are not reasonably necessary to stop clubs from going into debt.  For 
example, some say that alternatives used in other professional sports like a 
luxury tax for teams that overspend or revenue sharing between rich and poor 
teams could work within UEFA.171  Others suggest that by getting rid of the 
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transfer window, the time period in which transfers can be made, much of the 
inflated salaries and financial pressure will alleviate themselves naturally.172  
Because these alternatives could have an effect similar to the FFP rules while 
serving as a “less restrictive means of achieving the efficiencies,” this seems to 
make the FFP rules dispensable.173  In terms of the second part of the test, the 
restrictions on competition do appear to be reasonably necessary to achieving 
the goals of the FFP rules, but there are less restrictive alternatives of 
achieving the same efficiency. 
d.  No Elimination of Competition 
In order to receive the 101(3) protection, the FFP rules “must not afford 
the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products concerned.”174  The possibility of 
eliminating competition is significant here.  Clubs from smaller markets 
usually have smaller stadiums and less revenue.175  With the rules in place, 
now the clubs with bigger stadiums, better sponsorships, and more fans will 
generate more revenue and will, therefore, have a substantial advantage in 
terms of what they can spend.  These natural advantages are not necessarily 
anticompetitive; what eliminates competition is that the FFP rules prevent 
clubs with less revenue from spending anything beyond their income in order 
to acquire a larger market share and attract more revenue. 
It is not surprising that clubs with wealthy owners, who have already spent 
in excess of income, are supporting the rules.  They presumably have done so 
in order to gain an advantage by spending loads of money before the rules 
were implemented and, thus, catapulting themselves into a better position 
before they had to obey the rules.  Other clubs can no longer do the same.176  
The FFP rules essentially lock clubs into their current positions of profitability 
because they cannot spend more than their current income to get more 
visibility, success, and, ultimately, profit.177  This presents the possibility of 
eliminating many clubs from ever being able to legitimately compete with the 
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larger clubs for the best players and with each other on the field. 
Furthermore, even if an owner wants to build a bigger stadium for more 
revenue, only the finance costs178 of building a stadium can be taken out of the 
calculation of relevant expenses under the FFP rules if they “have been 
expensed in a reporting period rather than capitalised as part of the cost of the 
[stadium].”179  Even if they were able to build a stadium within these 
restrictions, they will still need a club that people want to see play.  While 
UEFA says that the FFP rules are supposed to help competition, it seems 
likely that they will only lock each club into its current position with little 
wiggle room to move up or down because of restraints on spending.180  Also, 
because of the amount of clubs in UEFA that are effected, the FFP rules do 
appear to eliminate competition “in respect of a substantial part of the products 
concerned.”181 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is understandable that, considering the current financial situations of 
many football clubs, UEFA would want to create rules that protect these clubs 
and the product their fans consume.  However, this must be done within the 
confines of competition law.  The purpose of this Article was to analyze 
whether this was done, both in terms of what protection, if any, the European 
Commission gave to the rules and also if the rules violated Article 101 of the 
Treaty. 
Regarding the question of whether the FFP rules enjoy a competition law 
exemption, it is clear that, contrary to what some think, the Commission did 
not extend such an exemption or approval to the FFP rules.  The joint 
statement from UEFA and the Commission only refers to the rules’ 
compatibility with state aid law and mentions nothing about competition law.  
The Commission has the authority to enforce EU competition law,182 and 
nothing suggests it will not do so here if it feels that the rules violate Article 
101. 
The answer to the second question of whether the FFP rules violate Article 
101 is that the rules are anticompetitive.  Article 101(1) prohibits agreements 
between undertakings that restrict, prevent, or distort competition.183  The FPP 
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rules represent the agreement of a number of undertakings, and the effect of 
the rules restrict, prevent, and distort competition.  The FFP rules restrict 
competition between clubs for players because the clubs cannot spend what 
they want on players, and only some can afford the better players while the 
rest are prevented from keeping up by the rules.184  The FFP rules also likely 
distort competition by preventing owners of poorer clubs from increasing 
revenue by injecting their own cash to buy better players and, thus, lock the 
clubs more or less into their current financial situation.185  The FFP rules also 
harm the market for player services by preventing players from receiving what 
they would in salary terms in an open market without restrictions and could 
harm the market for sponsorships if UEFA becomes more involved in 
regulating deals between clubs and sponsors. 
UEFA does have an effective defense against clubs and players by 
showing that they agreed to the FFP rules,186 which could undermine any 
complaints about the FFP rules.  However, it is unclear how effective the 
defense would be at the Commission or the Court of Justice, and the 
Commission can still investigate the competition law concerns relating to the 
rules regardless of the parties’ agreement to them.  Also, it is unlikely that 
Article 101(3) protection would be applied because the rules appear to 
eliminate competition and do not appear to be indispensable to achieving 
financial stability.187  Because it did not say anything about the FFP rules and 
competition law when it had the chance, the Commission’s stance on the 
position has not been defined.  However, Commission guidelines and Court of 
Justice case law applied to these facts suggest that the FFP rules do more harm 
than good to competition in European football. 
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